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ABSTRACT

This paper compares how three regional organizations, namely ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur, have addressed the question of movement of labor between member states. Most prominently, we compare the extent to which citizens of other member states are included into national systems of social protection within these regions. For each organization, the paper identifies milestone agreements that pertain to or move towards freedom of movement and/or allow intra-regional migrants to access social security. It connects the trajectory of agreements to the level of inequality at the respective points in time, both in regard to GDP per capita and, where available, welfare state effort measured as social expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Our findings point to regional inequality – especially in regard to economic standing and to some extent also welfare state effort – as factors that are associated with differences both between regional organizations as well as differences within organizations over time.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieses Papier vergleicht, wie die regionalen Organisationen ASEAN, EU und Mercosur Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit zwischen Mitgliedstaaten regulieren, einschließlich der Frage, inwieweit Bürger*innen anderer Mitgliedstaaten in die nationalen Wohlfahrtssysteme einbezogen werden. Für jede Organisation werden Meilensteinvereinbarungen identifiziert, die sich auf die Freizügigkeit und/oder den Zugang intraregionaler Migrant*innen zu sozialer Sicherung beziehen. In einem nächsten Schritt wird dann für die jeweiligen Zeitunkte der Grad der Ungleichheit zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten sowohl im Hinblick auf das Pro-Kopf-BIP als auch, soweit vorhanden, auf Sozialausgaben ausgewiesen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass regionale Ungleichheit – insbesondere im Hinblick auf das BIP, zum Teil aber auch für Sozialausgaben – mit Unterschieden sowohl zwischen regionalen Organisationen als auch mit Unterschieden innerhalb von Organisationen im Zeitverlauf assoziiert ist.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The question of how labor migration impacts systems of national social protection, or put differently, under which conditions substantial labor migration inflows and welfare states can co-exist, has specific relevance in the context of regional organizations. Although such organizations have developed different models in regard to intra-regional movement, a central aim of many – but not all – organizations is to ease intra-regional labor migration. These regional organizations are thus also faced with the question whether, and under which conditions, mobile labor will be covered by systems of social protection in receiver countries.

To our knowledge, comparative research into the variation across regional organizations regarding labor migration and social protection is lacking (for a notable exception see Hartlapp, 2016). In general, beyond the EU, migration policy of regional organizations has received little attention (Geddes, 2012), and the same can be said for regional approaches to social security. In this working paper, we thus compare ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur to broaden the view towards a comparative regionalism (Börzel, 2013). To this end, we address three research questions; two descriptive, and one analytical.

1. How has each of these three regional organizations addressed movement of labor between member states?
2. Which – if any – regional agreements exist on including citizens of other member states into national systems of social protection?
3. What explains differences in the responses to intra-regional migration and social protection of the mobile labor force in the three regional organizations?

While a number of factors are relevant in explaining these differences, in this working paper we investigate the hypothesis that regional agreements are less likely to manifest themselves in contexts with high economic and social spending inequality. Our theoretical argument is as follows: The literature on immigration and the welfare state iden-

tifies tensions, real or perceived, between mobile labor and social protection in an unequal world. Accordingly, rich and poor states have different interests in regard to reciprocal systems of social protection. The higher the inequality, the higher the tensions, and thus lack of agreements within regional organizations.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the potential conflicts that can arise within richer and poorer member states in regional organizations, as they face the challenge of managing both regional labor migration inflows and labor migrants' access to national systems of social protection. In the second section, we compare ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur. For each of the three regional organizations, we identify milestone agreements¹ that pertain to freedom of movement and/or allow intra-regional migrants² to access social security. We then report the level of inequality at the respective points in time, both in regard to GDP per capita and welfare state effort. After a discussion of the results, the paper proceeds with a short outline of some alternative explanatory factors, notably differences in welfare state regime across member states of the three regional organizations, as well as political institutions across the member states. We finish with some comments on avenues for potential further research.

2. MANAGING MIGRATION AND WELFARE STATES IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS – THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY

Labor migration flows across the world continue to grow (UN DESA, 2020) and economies of most industrialized countries rely on inflows of foreign workers (Boucher & Gest, 2018; Massey et al., 1993; Messina, 2007). Migrants fill labor short-

1 We use the term agreement in a wider sense, including both binding and non-binding documents.

2 Importantly, we put our focus on the rights of labor immigrants and do not consider the rights of asylum seekers and refugees.

ages, work jobs that non-immigrants do not want to take on, and their employment may fuel innovation in certain political economies (Chellaraj et al., 2005). Migrants can thus be considered an important factor input for productivity. Indeed, empirical studies have shown a positive relationship between immigration and economic growth (Boubtane et al., 2016; Bove & Elia, 2017). The fact that flexible flows of labor are economically beneficial³ makes freedom of movement a desirable objective for many regional organizations. Such organizations obviously may emerge for various reasons, but economic benefits of regional cooperation tend to be a main driver of such agreements (Mattli, 1999).

However, free movement of labor may also be problematic from the receiving countries perspective. People often move in the hope for a better life and therefore flows tend to lead from poorer to richer countries. Income differentials, inequality, and poverty have been found to be among the most prominent drivers of migration (Arango, 2017; Ashby, 2010; Black et al., 2011; Castles, 1998). Furthermore, the so called “welfare magnet” mechanism might reinforce the relationship between inequality and migration flows, however, not on the basis of economic differences, but differences in welfare state effort. According to this theory, it is not only a prospective higher income that draws migrants to a specific destination country, but also the prospect of generous benefits (Borjas, 1999)⁴. Taken together, richer states with larger welfare states will thus likely be the main receivers of immigrant labor.

The notion that there is an inherent tension between such large scale immigration and welfare state viability has been brought forward by a number of authors (see e.g. Alesina & Glaeser,

2004; Freeman, 1986; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; for an overview see also Sainsbury, 2012, pp. 1–2). In fact, for a number of reasons, namely lower recognized educational levels, lower recognized work experience, less language proficiency of the language spoken in the country of destination, and less relevant networks (Brücker et al., 2001; OECD, 2013) as well as risks of discrimination in the labor market (see Riach & Rich, 2002 for a review), foreign-born residents often have significantly lower employment rates than non-immigrants (Burgoon, 2014, p. 367; see also Diop-Christensen & Pavlopoulos, 2016; Auer et al., 2017).⁵ Consequently they are also more likely to claim welfare benefits and services (Jakubiak, 2020; Huber & Oberdabernig, 2016)⁶.

In sum, richer countries are thus likely to, on the one hand, benefit from migration, but they simultaneously face the question of how “economically inactive” migrants will affect systems of social protection.

It is, however, important to note that a large literature also points to the positive effects migration has on welfare states. Immigrants tend to be younger than the native born (Hammar, 1985, p.21; OECD, 2013, p. 126) and often also take on important jobs in the care sector. Regardless, positive and negative consequences of immigration stand side by side, and in political discourses it is up for debate whether the benefits outweigh the costs. Public opinion on the deservingness of immigrants clearly favors exclusionary stances (van Oorschot, 2006). In particular, the fear of a welfare magnet has resonated widely in political and public debates (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012) and especially in regard to non-contributory benefits, newcomers are typically seen as likely constituting a fiscal burden (Brubaker, 1989; Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2020). Taken

3 Migration also may induce economic costs, notably in regard to individual wage levels and employment. The literature however finds that the labor market effects of immigration will be context dependent (e.g. depend on skills of immigrants, skills of workers already residing in destination countries). Furthermore, effects differ in the short and long run (see e.g. Dustmann et al., 2013; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012).

4 The empirical evidence in the literature is mixed on whether there is a magnet effect (for a discussion see Ponce, 2019).

5 Most of these studies focus on the main destination countries in the Global North. However, the mechanisms are likely the same also in other contexts.

6 A large literature also engages with the negative consequences of increases in migration and ethnic diversity for public support for the welfare state (see e.g. Eger & Breznau, 2017). Reviewing these is however out of the scope of this working paper.

together, these findings indicate that for countries that receive immigrant inflows, costs – either perceived or real – are likely of high importance.

In the context of regional organizations, these findings implicate that frictions and disagreements are likely to increase with the level of inequality between member states. Each member state will individually assess the costs and benefits of allowing freedom of movement and social protection of the regional mobile labor force. If member states are relatively similar it is likely that also costs and benefits of allowing for free movement of labor will be evaluated similarly, which makes reaching an agreement easier. If differences between member states are rather large, the distribution of costs and benefits is likely diverse and it is thus also more likely that integration will be constrained (see also Scharpf, 2002).

Bruzelius and Seeleib-Kaiser (2020) also offer evidence to suggest that economic inequality, in the context of confederations, will have detrimental effects on integration. In their study, they compare three federations which included free-movement agreements; the Northern German Federation, Switzerland and the US. They illustrate that rich net immigration states were less likely to support reforms to allow migrants from other parts of the federation to access their minimum income protection schemes compared to net emigration states, who were also often comparatively poorer.

This mechanism can be expected to hold both in the face of inequality in regard to economic development as well as social spending efforts, though the underlying assumptions and motivations slightly differ. In regard to economic inequality, richer states will expect higher levels of migration based on differences in wage levels and job opportunities. Regarding inequality concerning welfare effort, states that spent more might be led by the expectation that migrants move for generous benefit. Both types of inequality however are thought to fuel migration in the same direction though.

While we assert inequality to play a role in explaining differences between regional organizations, we do not claim that it is the sole ex-

planatory factor. Rather, we highlight the likely relevance of welfare state characteristics, both across and within the member states of regional organizations. On the one hand, established welfare states may hold strong incentives to protect resource depletion caused by immigration. However, previous research has shown that, in established welfare states, there is more support for protecting immigrant workers from social risks, and that more generous welfare states rather tend to grant more rights to migrants (Römer, 2017). Also, strong unions in advanced welfare states push for including migrants in systems of social protection, as otherwise there is the danger that employers might use migrant labor to drive down wages (see e.g. Boräng et al., 2020). In welfare states that provide little social protection even for citizens on the other hand, there might simply be no benefit schemes in place that could be opened up for migrants.

In the descriptive and analytical empirics that follow, we will predominantly explore the role of inequality in regard to both GDP as well as welfare state effort as drivers of extension – and restriction – of free movement agreements and social protection schemes within regional organizations. However, in the discussion we will come back to the role of the welfare state, and also other explanatory factors.

3. THREE REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COMPARED

To some extent, agreements on regional freedom of movement precede the issues of whether to include regional migrants into national systems of social protection. Fully realized freedom of movement for labor migration is however rare (Deacon et al., 2011). Among the three regional organizations that we compare in this working paper only the European Union claims such an arrangement. Nevertheless, as the next section will show, even in the absence of fully realized freedom of movement, regional organizations have addressed the social protection of migrant workers.

3.1 Methodology

The following empirical analysis compares ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur. It uses a number of data sources and presents findings in two main ways. Firstly, we provide a descriptive overview of the development of each regional organisation, with particular focus on labor mobility and social security agreements. To do so, we refer to secondary literature, reports from the regional organisations and international organisations such as the World Bank and OECD.

Secondly, we present statistics on regional inequality using GDP per capita as a traditional indicator for economic inequality between countries. However, GDP per capita alone does not necessarily take into account differences in welfare expenditure, which are crucial to understand the inequality in social protection between countries within a region. As a second indicator we thus consider welfare state effort, measured as social expenditures as a percentage of the GDP. For both indicators, we calculate (1) the ratio between the countries with the highest and lowest GDP per capita (or social expenditures as a percentage of GDP), and (2) the Gini coefficient as a measurement of inequality⁷, for all countries that are member states at the respective points in time, i.e. the year of a milestone agreement.

In order to ensure a high level of comparability within, but also between the regions, we searched for uniform data sets. For our GDP calculation, we use the comprehensive data set provided by the World Bank (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US \$) covering all the countries in the time period required. For *social expenditures as a percentage of the GDP*, there is no uniform dataset that covers all the regions, and therefore we take different data sources into account. To secure a high degree of comparability between the countries and regions, we include health expenditures in social expenditures. There are comprehensive and uni-

form data sets for the EU (OECD) and MERCOSUR (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)). In contrast, the ASEAN key indicator base includes missing data. In order to ensure the greatest possible completeness of our inequality indicator, we thus complement this dataset with additional sources, in particular national data from the statistical office or government reports⁸. Missing data is clearly denoted in the text and tables.

3.2 ASEAN

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. At the time of founding, the organization's main objective was regional security and the national interest of each member state was (and still is) perceived as a high good (Auehavornpipat, 2019; Geiger, 2015, p.19; Nonnenmacher, 2017, pp. 351–352). Therefore there was no attempt to build overarching regional institutions that would impede on national sovereignty which limits implementation and enforcement.

Over time, ASEAN has moved towards promoting economic integration. Increased cooperation has included numerous agreements directed at freedom of movement and social protection of migrant workers (see Table 1).

Importantly, the founding document of ASEAN, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, does not mention (labor) mobility as a specific goal of the organization (IOM, 2007, p. 13), and the first “milestone”, the 1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), occurs almost 30 years after the organizations' founding (Nonnenmacher, 2017, p. 354). The AFAS was based on the General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 of the World Trade Organization and focuses on the free movement of services including recognition of professional degrees. Importantly, the

⁷ We use the following formula:
$$G = \sum_{i=1}^n (H_i + H_{i-1})q_i - 1$$

 H_i = cumulated relative frequency of cases, i.e. countries; q_i = GDP (or social expenditures as percentage of GDP) as a share of the totalized GDP (or social expenditures as percentage of GDP) of all countries

⁸ We have to note that the inclusion of these different data could partly lead to some distortions within a single time series of a country or between the ASEAN countries.

Table 1.
ASEAN agreements on freedom of movement and social protection

Year	Agreement
1995	ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)
1997	ASEAN Vision 2020
1998	Hanoi Plan of Action
2000	ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters
Since 2005	Mutual Recognition Agreements of professional qualifications for services trade
2006	Introduction of a two-week visa-free entry for ASEAN nationals
	Adoption of the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
2007	Adoption of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint
2008	ASEAN Charter
2012	ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons
2013	ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection
2018	ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers

Source: own presentation.

focus was quite narrowly set on skilled and highly skilled workers. The AFAS also contained a number of restrictions e.g. in regard to size of admitted number of migrants and the permitted sectors of work (Martin & Abella, 2014, p. 19).

Shortly afterwards, the commitment to a free movement of services was again underlined in the 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020, but no specific provisions were agreed on, also due to the arrival of the financial crisis (Nonnenmacher, 2017, p. 352; Tamagno, 2008, p. 30). The 1998 Hanoi Plan of Action (1999-2004) that was adopted after the crisis took up the topic of immigration again, again with a focus on skilled migration flows. It also called for the establishment of “ASEAN Lanes” at airports for facilitating intra-ASEAN travel (Geiger, 2015, p. 189). Both documents did not address the much more pressing issue of how to deal with intraregional low skilled migration flows and also did not include clear guidelines on implementation.

In 1999, more concrete steps were taken towards achieving the goals laid out in the Vision 2020 and the Hanoi Plan of Action. It was agreed to establish an institutional framework for ASEAN cooperation on immigration. The ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters also included calls for information exchange, co-

operation in regard to legal and law enforcement matters and training (Nonnenmacher, 2017, p. 374).

Furthermore, since 2005 a number of Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) were set up (Nonnenmacher, 2017, p. 367; Tamagno, 2008, p. 31). Their main objective was to allow for the recognition of qualifications of several different service providing professions (Tietje & Lang, 2021, p. 540)⁹. Again, this was thus mainly targeting the free movement of skilled and highly skilled (also referred to as “professionals” or “talent”), and did not address labor migration in general. In 2006, ASEAN members then agreed to allow for a two-week visa-free entry for all ASEAN nationals (IOM, 2007, p. 13). This was followed by two of further agreements, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint (2007) and the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (2012).

The AEC continues to promote the freer movement of skilled migrants to realize a single ASEAN market by 2015 through a number of instruments directed at recognition of degrees (Geiger, 2015,

⁹ Engineering, Nursing, Architecture, Surveying, Medical and Dental Practitioners, Accountancy, Tourism

p. 189). Importantly however, as in previous agreements this does not lead to the free movement of holders of such degrees. The Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons is in so far exceptional as it is the first agreement that focuses exclusively on migration, but it nevertheless remains limited to skilled migration, and even that migration is supposed to be temporary, and a number of limitations (e.g. labor market tests and quotas) remain in place (Jurje & Lavenex, 2015, p. 5).

The fact that freedom of movement for labor migrants is not established in ASEAN also has implications for the social protection of regional migrant workers. Given that there is no clear privileged category of "regional migrant", questions of regional cooperation in the policy field of social protection also are less relevant or pressing. Nevertheless, there are at least four "milestones" regional agreements that touch upon the issue of social protection of migrant workers.

First, the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers identified obligations for countries of origin and destination and for ASEAN itself to protect migrant workers. The declaration however addresses the rights of *all* migrant workers, and, with the exception of a minimum wage, does not specifically talk about intra-ASEAN migrant workers. The 2007 ASEAN Economic Community went a step further. It recommends the extension of national welfare states provisions while at the same time as furthering regional measures on cooperating in regard to social protection (ILO, 2014, p. 103). In a similar vein, the 2008 ASEAN charter promises to increase social welfare across the region. The most recent document on the topic is the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Signed in 2018, this document states that ASEAN migrant workers are entitled to equal treatment in receiv-

Table 2.
Inequality in regard to GDP per capita in ASEAN

Year	GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$)		
	Mean GDP all member states	Ratio highest/lowest GDP	Gini coefficient GDP
1995	11.623,62	64,65	0,60
1997	9.387,70	137,02	0,67
1998	8.933,17	127,44	0,67
2000	8.627,15	105,02	0,69
Since 2005	9.663,05	67,72	0,68
2006	10.087,36	63,97	0,68
2007	10.346,13	61,60	0,68
2008	10.149,40	56,60	0,67
2012	11.179,34	57,38	0,66
2013	11.311,28	56,05	0,66
2018	12.320,19	49,12	0,65

Notes: Own calculations, sources: World Bank Data (Indicator: GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$). For a more detailed overview, including information on membership and country-specific data, see Appendix 1A. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question.

ing countries regardless of their gender and nationality. All four agreements are, however, non-binding, and member states retain the right to act within the limits of their national laws.

To summarize, overall regional integration in regard to labor migration between ASEAN member states remains limited (Gulzau et al., 2016; Tamagno, 2008, p. 30). Agreements continue to be non-binding and patchy. Intra-regional migrant workers are mostly excluded from measures of social protection, and even in cases where they are technically included, there is no effective protection (Geiger, 2015, p. 186; Martin & Abella, 2014). Nevertheless, the topic is not absent from the political agenda, as it seems to have generated some momentum recently.

How does this low level of regional cooperation on migration and social protection relate to regional inequality? The ten member states of ASEAN exhibit very different levels of economic development. In 2018, the richest country Sin-

gapore achieved a GDP per capita of roughly \$60,000, whereas in the poorest member state Cambodia GDP per capita amounted to only \$1.200. Table 2 shows where regional inequality in regard to GDP per capita stood at each year of a milestone agreement, reporting the mean, the ratio highest to lowest GDP and the gini coefficient for the GDP per capita of all member states at the respective points in time.

Three things are noteworthy. First, the mean of GDP per capita in ASEAN is not especially low. Of the three organizations discussed in this paper, ASEAN in fact takes the middle position, with the mean GDP per capita being higher than the one in the Mercosur member states (see Table 8). However, as the ratio of highest to lowest GDP underlines, the relatively high mean per capita GDP masks the fact that there is a definite imbalance between rich and poor countries in the organization. In 2018, the GDP of Singapore was almost fifty times that of the poorest country Cambodia.

Table 3.
Inequality in regard to social expenditures in ASEAN

Year	Social expenditures as percentage of GDP		
	Mean soc. exp. all member states (%)	Ratio highest/ lowest soc. exp.	Gini coefficient soc. exp.
1967	data not available		
1995	data not available		
1997	data not available		
1998	data not available		
2000	2,24	3,13	0,21
Since 2005	1,54	8,39	0,30
2006	1,91	7,04	0,24
2007	2,15	8,17	0,28
2008	2,12	6,93	0,23
2012	2,17	5,36	0,25
2013	2,47	3,68	0,22
2018	2,69	1,48	0,07

Notes: Own calculations, sources: World Bank Data (Indicator: GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$). For a more detailed overview, including information on membership and country-specific data, see Appendix 1A. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question.

Third, this high level of inequality, as illustrated by the Gini coefficient that varies between 0,60 and 0,69, is relatively stable across all milestones.

Regarding regional inequality, a variable of crucial importance is the extent to which ASEAN member states are unequal in terms of welfare expenditure. Table 3 illustrates that the mean social expenditure across ASEAN is very low – the lowest of all regional organizations considered here. This is unsurprising, given that welfare states are less developed in these countries. Nonetheless, the gini coefficient, demonstrating inequality between countries' social expenditure levels, is high, although recent introduction of social programs in many countries has led to a decrease over time (also illustrated by the decrease in the ratio between highest and lowest).

In line with theoretical expectations, the high level of inequality in the region is associated with asymmetrical regional migration flows. ASEAN Member states can be divided into three groups. The high income countries Singapore and Brunei and the upper middle income countries Malaysia and Thailand are net receivers of regional migration. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam – though overall net emigration countries – exhibit both emigration and immigration, whereas the low income countries Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar finally are clearly net emigration countries, with very little immigrant inflows.

This overall pattern of sending and receiving countries did not change over time. However, importantly since the 1990s, intra-regional movement of migrant workers in ASEAN has significantly increased (see also Testaverde et al., 2017, p. 42). Since 1995, intra-regional migrants clearly outnumber migrants from other regions (see Appendix 4). ASEAN is a special case in this regard, as we will see in comparison with the EU and Mercosur.

It is important to note that these flows mainly consist of low-skilled workers that are employed in sectors such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, garment industry and domestic work. Furthermore, much of the migration in ASEAN continues to be irregular (Geiger, 2015, p. 186; Martin & Abella, 2014, p. 25). This migrant work force is of high economic importance for the re-

ceiving countries. Already in the 2000s, in Singapore 28% of the workforce were migrant workers, in Malaysia 16% (Battistella, 2007, p. 205). The fact that these workers often have unstable legal status and no legal rights to social protections makes them vulnerable to exploitation and wage dumping (Piper, 2004).

That net receiving states are opposed to agreeing on measures of social protection that would potentially drive up wages and induce other costs can be illustrated with the negotiations surrounding the Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers that started in 2007. Sending states Philippines and Indonesia initiated a comprehensive proposal. This was subsequently reformulated by Singapore and Malaysia, who cut relevant sections of the document in regard to the rights of undocumented migrants, family members of migrants and most importantly, the legally binding nature of the document (Auethavornpipat, 2019, p. 161). In the end, after years of negotiating, the receiving states were able to assert that the consensus of 2018 remained non-binding.

3.3 The European Union

The European Union, established by the Maastricht treaty (1992), developed from the European Economic Community (EEC) of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of the Treaty of Paris (1951). Table 4 shows the list of relevant treaties, directives and legislation. Both freedom of movement and the social rights of all EU citizens have taken a prominent place in the development of this regional organization, which makes it unique among our three cases.

The focus of the ECSC was limited to workers in specific industries (coal and steel) and in this regard similar to the ASEAN MRAs. The Treaty of Rome already strove for the creation of a fair single or "common" market and customs union between member states, which included core provisions for the free movement of all labor. Italy, facing high domestic unemployment successfully fought for free movement of labor, and already in 1958 reg-

Table 4.
EU agreements on freedom of movement and social protection

Year	Agreement
1951	Treaty of Paris
1957	Treaty of Rome
1958	Regulations No. 3 & 4 coordination of social security for migrant workers
1971	Regulation No. 1408/71
1972	Regulation No. 574/72
Since 1985	Schengen Agreements
1987	Single European Act
1992	Treaty of Maastricht
1997	Treaty of Amsterdam
2004	Directive 2004/38
2009	Treaty of Lisbon

Source: own presentation.

ulations No. 3 and 4 took the first steps to coordinate social security protection for migrant workers (Barnard & Butlin, 2018). Rights to equal treatment regarding employment in all member states (regulation EEC no 1612/68, replaced by the Free Movement Regulation 2011) were extended in the late 1960s. Between 1968 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/3, the European communities expanded in size to include Denmark, Ireland, the UK, and later Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Maastricht treaty included the goal of “European Citizenship”, which shifted the legal and political focus of free movement of labor to free movement of citizens. Today, such free movement encompasses 27 member states (28 until the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, for which free movement rights were severed in January 2021).

The development of freedom of movement was accompanied by steps towards social citizenship. The treaty of Rome in 1957, article 21 (3) of the TFEU allowed for the coordination of social security (see also Article 48 TFEU). The free movement of workers in the EU was accompanied by principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment (Dølvik & Visser, 2009, p. 516). The EU coordinates, rather than homogenizes, social security though and individual member states can still determine their own welfare benefit systems. EU migrant workers however were not subject to expulsion following unemployment, and could move to

look for work and, until 2004, in principle apply for social assistance whilst job-searching.

Importantly, these rights have been and continue to be the subject of much interpretation not only by member states in the council of ministers, but also in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In a number of critical cases in the ECJ, Member State restrictions on EU citizens’ access to tax-financed services were repeatedly rejected (Martinsen & Falkner, 2011; Verschueren, 2012). This was then incorporated into the relevant secondary law regulations, because ECJ case law has constitutional status and EU member states must apply the case law directly into their legislation (Blauberger & Schmidt, 2017). The extension of welfare rights to EU citizens, not only workers, is the basis for the controversy and political contestation of the coordination of social benefits (Schmidt et al., 2018).

Currently, the coordination of social security and freedom of movement is managed by regulation 883/2004 and directive 2004/38. According to these rules, EU internal migrants should be “habitually resident”, which may refer to only three months residency, to receive welfare benefits. Not only workers, but all EU citizens are included in these social security arrangements. However, the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment are not applied unconditionally, and economically inactive EU citizens are subject

to restrictions. They can move and take residence for up to three months unconditionally, but if they do not get a job within this time period, they must show comprehensive sickness insurance and sufficient resources in order to keep their residence rights. Economically inactive EU citizens can be excluded from accessing social assistance benefits in another Member State for the duration of up to five years of lawful residence.

Since 2009, there have been no further agreements that would move in the direction of a fully realized “Social Europe”. A “Social Europe” would probably require a harmonization, not only coordination, of social security arrangements across member states. Currently “portable” benefits, such as contributory unemployment benefits, do not fulfil needs if exported from poorer to richer countries. EU citizens are, in theory, able to look for work in another member state country and take their unemployment benefit with them, but, given discrepancies in unemployment benefit levels across new and old member states, this is unfeasible for many (Bruzelius et al., 2017). The exportability of benefits also raises questions of fairness, particularly

when unemployment benefit is taken from richer to poorer member states, where activation is low (Schmidt et al., 2020).

Furthermore, over time, European member states have attempted to exercise more conditionality over residency requirements and the definition of “habitual residence” before internal EU migrants can receive benefits. The ECJ has increasingly ruled in the member states’ favor, such that for the first three months, or potentially longer in the case of job-seeking migrants, member states can decide whether to allow access to social security benefits (Bruzelius & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2020). Secondly, the portability of child benefits and the inclusion of children living in poorer member states have become highly politicized, with many actors promulgating the introduction of a benchmark relative to living standards in poorer member states, when benefits are exported from richer member states (for a discussion of the UK case see Currie, 2016).

To summarize, regional integration in the EU is exceptionally developed in comparison to ASEAN and Mercosur. Both freedom of movement and social protection of regional mobile

Table 5.
Inequality in regard to GDP per capita in the EU

Year	GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$)		
	Mean GDP all member states	Ratio highest/ lowest GDP	Gini coefficient GDP
1951	data not available		
1957	data not available		
1971	23.490,56	2,01	0,13
1972	24.431,18	2,06	0,13
Since 1985	24.459,96	2,56	0,16
1987	28.744,58	3,88	0,20
1992	33.325,73	4,03	0,20
1997	37.154,75	4,03	0,17
2004	32.924,04	10,38	0,32
2009	32.110,68	15,15	0,33

Note: Own calculations, sources: OECD 2021, partly supplemented by the Eurostat database, see, in detail, Appendix 2A. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question.

labor are among the founding ideals of the organization. However, in recent years, social integration has become increasingly problematized, and the recalibration of social rights for internal movers, in combination with few further integration steps in this direction point to a stagnation of social protection integration. How does this trajectory relate to regional inequality?

The accession of new member states has undeniably led to an increase in inequality across the EU. Table 5 shows that the enlargements of 2004 and 2009 have accelerated the steady increase in inequality over time. Wage levels also vary hugely across EU countries. In 2014, the average yearly (net) salary in the 10 newest Middle and Eastern European member state countries¹⁰ ranged from 2,600 – 8,500, and those of the original six countries ranged from 15,500 – 20,000 (Bruzeilius et al., 2017).

Interestingly, inequality is not as pronounced in regard to social expenditures. Table 6 shows that the ratio of highest to lowest social spending is relatively stable, and the gini is relatively low.

10 Slovenia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania

However, social expenditures are of course only a proxy for welfare provisions. In fact, the EU hosts both more comprehensive and less comprehensive welfare state regimes and given a low GDP, a high percentage of social spending still may amount to a rather limited set of benefits and services.

Overall, the data confirm that the EU has become more unequal, and that there are strong incentives for citizens of new member states to move to richer member states to look for work. In line with this, in 2015 Germany and the UK were the two main recipients of intra-regional flow, whereas Poland and Romania were main sending countries. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix 5, the migrant stock of internal EU migrants increased steadily between 1990 and 2005, and then doubled in the following ten years. Nevertheless, the immigrant population from outside the union remains much larger, and economically, intra-regional migration is not as pivotal as in ASEAN as receiving states can still revert to migrants from other regions. Still, taken together the growth in intra-regional migration accompanied by the strong differentiation between sending and receiving countries has fueled the politicization of free movement and the notion of a “welfare burden” which ultimately hampers further steps towards integration.

Table 6.
Inequality in regard to social expenditures in the EU

Year	Social expenditures as percentage of GDP		
	Mean soc. exp. all member states	Ratio highest/ lowest soc. exp.	Gini coefficient soc. exp.
1951		data not available	
1957		data not available	
1971		data not available	
1972		data not available	
Since 1985	20,89	1,66	0,08
1987	19,15	2,35	0,11
1992	20,69	1,86	0,10
1997	22,09	1,86	0,12
2004	20,51	2,20	0,13
2009	22,82	1,84	0,11

Note: Own calculations, sources: OECD 2021, partly supplemented by the Eurostat database, see, in detail, Appendix 2B. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question.

3.4 MERCOSUR

Mercosur was established in 1991 with the Treaty of Asunción between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The number of member states is thus relatively small, however, over time, a number of countries received associated status¹¹. Economic considerations were the main driving force at the beginning. The institutional structure of Mercosur can be characterized as situated between the EU and ASEAN – although there are some supranational institutions, notably a parliament and a court of appeal, intergovernmental cooperation is still prevalent (Hartlapp, 2016).

Table 7 lists the six milestone agreements that have been brought forward in the Mercosur community. Already the founding document, the Treaty of Asunción indirectly mentions labor mobility, in so far that “mobility of factors of production” is referenced in chapter I, Article 5. Recognition of a social or political dimension to free movement is thus not immediately apparent. Similar to the EU however, in Mercosur, from the beginning discussions of freedom of movement were accompanied by calls for coordinating and collaborating in regard to social protection.

Two agreements are relevant here. The 1997 Multilateral Social Security Agreement allows cit-

izens of Mercosur states to transfer social security rights¹² acquired in a member state to any other member state (CIDI, 2015). With the agreement, a coordination office was established, too (Hartlapp, 2016, p. 110). Also the 1998 Social-Labor Declaration underlined the commitment to social protection of labor migrants in the region, which was followed by setting up an institutional structure that was supposed to further develop ideas and monitor implementation (Hartlapp, 2016, p. 112). The declaration was amended and renewed in 2015.

At the beginning of the 2000s Mercosur re-oriented itself, and freedom of movement and regional citizenship became a focus of the organization. The main agreement of this reorientation is the 2002 Residence Agreement (in force since 2009), according to which anyone from a Mercosur member state or an associated state who has no previous conviction can stay and work in another state for two years. If sufficient financial means can then be proven, a permanent right of residence arises (Arcarazo & Geddes, 2014, p. 32). In addition, a citizenship statute was signed in 2010 which, on the 30th anniversary of the Asunción Treaty, is intended to enforce freedom of movement, equal treatment with regard to civil, social, cultural and economic rights and equal access to work, health and education (Maas, 2015, pp. 115–116).

¹¹ Venezuela is a full member but has been suspended since 1 December 2016. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname are associated countries. Associated states are in principal free to adhere to the political, social and citizen dimensions of MERCOSUR, and are thus incorporated in our analyses.

¹² In principal, this refers to all contributory benefits a member states grants under its own legislation. However, de facto this amounts to healthcare and pension benefits (old-age and disability) (CIDI, 2015)

Table 7.
Mercosur agreements on freedom of movement and social protection

Year	Agreement
1991	Treaty of Asuncion
1997	Multilateral Social Security Agreement
1998	Social-Labor Declaration
2002	Free Movement and Residence Agreement
2004	Declaration of Principles about Migratory Policy
2010	Citizenship Statute (Decision 64/10)

Source: own presentation

Table 8.
Inequality in regard to GDP per capita in Mercosur

Year	GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$)		
	Mean GDP all member states	Ratio highest/ lowest GDP	Gini coefficient GDP
1991	6.333,33	2,23	0,13
1997	6.804,36	5,79	0,22
1998	6.922,28	5,84	0,22
2002	6.434,71	6,11	0,25
2004	6.608,16	6,90	0,28
2010	8.266,17	7,07	0,27

Note: Own calculations, sources: World Bank Data (Indicator: GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$), see, in detail, Appendix 3A. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question. As they can participate in the political, social and citizen dimensions of MERCOSUR, associated member states are included in the calculations.

Overall, Mercosur can thus be characterized as promoting a very far reaching ideal of free movement and open borders, conceptualizing migration as a human right, which includes the decriminalization of undocumented migrants (Acosta, 2018). Compared to the EU however, the expansion of rights has not been accompanied by binding enforcement mechanisms, even though there are a number of intergovernmental migration forums, such as the South American Conference on Migration and the MERCOSUR Specialized Migration Forum (Tietje & Lang, 2021, p. 544).

In line with theoretical expectations, these agreements developed in a relatively equal setting. Table 8 depicts regional inequality in regard to GDP per capita. As was already touched upon earlier, Mercosur exhibits the lowest mean of GDP per capita of all three organizations compared in this paper. Both the ratio of highest to lowest GDP and the gini coefficient underline that even though inequality is not absent, it is lower than in ASEAN and the EU after the enlargements. However, inequality is slightly increasing over time. A similar picture emerges in regard to inequality of social spending (Table 9). Even though social spending

became more unequal, overall it remains in the medium range, and has been stable in the decade from 2000-2010.

The lower level of inequality is accompanied by more symmetry in migration flows compared to ASEAN and the EU. All countries are senders and receivers, even if Argentina and to some extent Brazil stand out as receiving countries (see also Arcarazo & Geddes, 2014, p. 38). Overall, as in ASEAN and the EU, intra-regional migration is increasing, but of the three organizations, Mercosur appears to rely the least on intra-regional migration compared to extra-regional migration (see Appendix 6).

The case of Mercosur is however not only an example for how lower levels of inequality make agreements more likely, but also underlines the importance of political factors. Argentina, although one of the main receiving countries in the region, has been one of the main drivers of extending freedom of movement in Mercosur (Arcarazo & Geddes, 2014). Already with democratization, human rights-oriented migration policy became more important and the election of left governments in all Mercosur member states in the begin-

Table 9.
Inequality in regard to social expenditure in Mercosur

Year	Social expenditures as percentage of GDP		
	Mean soc. exp. all member states	Ratio highest/ lowest soc. exp.	Gini coefficient soc. exp.
1991	Data not available		
1997	6,85 ^a	2,30 ^a	0,13 ^a
1998	7,18 ^a	2,02 ^a	0,13 ^a
2002	6,14	5,29	0,21
2004	4,69	42,17	0,28
2010	5,50	6,52	0,27

^a without Paraguay, data not available.

Note: Own calculations; source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT database, see, in detail, Appendix 3B. Calculations are based on the states that are members in the year in question. As they can participate in the political, social and citizen dimensions of MERCOSUR, associated member states are included in the calculations.

ning of the 2000s led to a further commitment to open borders. With the populist right wing turn of politics in Brazil and Argentina, further stagnation and potentially even some rollback become more likely (Brumat & Acosta, 2019).

4. DISCUSSION

Does our argument - that more inequality leads to fewer agreements – hold up to the data and analysis at hand? The data presented in this working paper show that higher levels of economic and to some extent social spending inequality are associated with lower levels of regional integration regarding free movement and social protection of mobile workers. Inequalities may thus help explain both differences between regions as well as developments over time.

In ASEAN large regional inequality and ensuing asymmetric migration, combined with the benefits of exploiting illegalized workers have led to a general lack of consensus as regards how regional migration should be both eased

and encouraged. Nevertheless, with an increase in the importance of intra-regional migration that is accompanied with a slight downward trend in regional inequality there might be a potential change in the lines of conflict and power imbalances between countries of origin and countries of destination in the future.

The European Union started out as a coalition of relatively equal partners, and accordingly set out on a path towards far reaching agreements on freedom of movement and regional social security. With a growing number of member states, inequality has however risen. Subsequently the interpretation of EU citizens' rights in the ECJ has become more restrictive and the project of "Social Europe" has come to a halt. As the case of Brexit exemplifies, one of the rich, "net contributor" member states has even responded to growing politicization of these issues by leaving the union (Schmidt, 2020). Nevertheless, stagnation rather than reversal characterizes the current state of affairs. Strong path dependency thus continues to keep existing far-reaching agreements in place, making the EU still the most integrated of the three organizations compared in this paper.

Mercosur finally has comparatively low levels of inequality and quite far reaching agreements, with Mercosur “citizenship” being an attempt to fully integrate the region. However, the literature problematizes the lack of reliable implementation of these far reaching goals. Furthermore, political factors are of main importance. It remains to be seen whether the organization will follow through with the human rights based approach, or whether the recent political changes will result in further roll-back and stagnation. Finally, it remains to be seen whether Bolivia becoming a full member might change the (im)balance of power.

Whilst our study thus corroborates the significance of inequality, some questions remain unanswered. Firstly, the negative correlation between inequality and integration agreements for labor mobility appears contradictory in some cases. Comparing the EU and Mercosur, for example, low regional inequality in the latter region has not led directly to more agreements on social protection, whereas in the EU, higher regional inequality due to new member states has not led to severe cuts in social protection. However, there are evidently strong path dependent processes at work in the EU, and the finding that these systems are under political pressure to be recalibrated is evidence that increases in inequality do have an effect on preparedness to extend social rights to internal movers. Further research could clarify the micro-dynamics of the inequality mechanism.

Relatedly, we cited some evidence that net-receiving countries oppose opening their systems of social protection, but we could not explore in detail how exactly different member states have asserted their interests, i.e. how decision-making processes within the organizations played out. More in depth case studies of individual negotiations – both successful and failed – would help disentangle this black box. In this context, also the size of the regional organization in regard to the number of member states is likely relevant for decision making processes. Finally, the example of Argentina showed that net receiving countries do not necessarily always push for restrictive rules. Political ideologies play a decisive role, and will need to be considered in further research.

In the theoretical section of this paper, we briefly discussed the role welfare state characteristics might play in the context of our research question. In fact, between the three regional organizations that we compared in this paper, welfare state effort and type vary considerably. The European Union is home to some of the most generous welfare states in the world, Mercosur takes a middle position, with welfare state effort considerably lower and less comprehensive than in Europe, and in the ASEAN member states finally, welfare states are the least developed. We found that rights are the most developed in the EU, which gives some support to the hypothesis that welfare state effort is positively associated with freedom of movement and regional social citizenship. This might also help to explain why integration is further developed in the EU than in Mercosur, though levels of inequality are lower in Mercosur. However, further research is needed unveil the underlying mechanisms.

Finally, and related to the previous point, the three regional organizations are home to very different institutions and political systems. The number of member states varies between organizations, and likely will affect the ease of difficulty of coming to agreements. Furthermore, in European Union member states democracy levels are higher than in Mercosur member states, which in turn are on average more democratic than the member states of ASEAN, though these regime classifications are also subjects to change over time. The emergence of supranational structures, the nature of national welfare states and the strengths of the judiciary are however not independent from the political systems in member states. All three factors are likely to play a role in explaining differences between organizations, and should thus be the subject of further inquiries.

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Appendix 1a:
Inequality in regard to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$), ASEAN 1967 - 2005

Member States	Accession	1967 Bangkok Declaration	1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services	1997 ASEAN Vision 2020	1998 Hanoi Plan of Action	2000 ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters	Since 2005 Mutual Recognition Agreements
Indonesia	1967	657,01	2.220,08	2.433,34	2.084,14	2.143,66	2.524,22
Malaysia	1967	1.716,47	6.277,61	7.041,67	6.360,66	7.007,04	7.974,25
The Philippines	1967	1.249,16	1.565,41	1.665,36	1.619,36	1.668,72	1.893,70
Singapore	1967	4.834,99	29.473,43	31.856,61	30.116,54	33.850,75	40.498,72
Thailand	1967	790,45	3.531,79	3.546,40	3.236,39	3.458,35	4.337,88
Brunei Darussalam	1984		37.713,69	36.409,37	35.390,79	35.931,60	36.329,50
Vietnam	1995		583,31	669,91	699,62	765,19	1.018,12
Laos	1997			600,93	613,32	672,88	842,91
Myanmar	1997			265,72	277,71	342,14	598,07
Cambodia	1999					431,20	613,13
Mean		1.849,62	11.623,62	9.387,70	8.933,17	8.627,15	9.663,05
Standard deviation		1.538,50	14.166,60	13.412,53	12.910,55	13.275,75	14.563,92
Gap highest - lowest GDP		4.177,98	37.130,38	36.143,65	35.113,08	35.589,46	39.900,65
Ratio highest/lowest GDP		7,36	64,65	137,02	127,44	105,02	67,72
Gini coefficient		0,40	0,60	0,67	0,67	0,69	0,68

Own calculations, source: World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$)

Appendix 1a:

Inequality in regard to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$), ASEAN 2006 - 2018

Member States	Accession	2006 Introduction of a two-week visa-free entry for ASEAN nationals*	2007		2008 ASEAN charter	2012 ASEAN Agreement on Movement of Natural Persons	2013 ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection	2018 ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
			Adoption of the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers	Adoption of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint				
Indonesia	1967	2.627,91	2.757,89		2.885,31	3.421,27	3.563,30	4.284,69
Malaysia	1967	8.255,29	8.605,02		8.850,01	9.743,10	10.061,72	12.131,49
The Philippines	1967	1.958,93	2.051,23		2.105,11	2.379,67	2.497,69	3.190,78
Singapore	1967	42.785,58	44.742,41		43.216,26	50.143,78	51.724,98	59.073,49
Thailand	1967	4.525,96	4.745,30		4.801,88	5.437,88	5.558,74	6.370,02
Brunei Darussalam	1984	37.399,74	36.987,84		35.844,42	35.967,33	34.729,83	31.436,87
Vietnam	1995	1.079,06	1.145,14		1.198,42	1.443,49	1.505,81	1.964,48
Laos	1997	900,78	953,09		1.010,39	1.290,84	1.373,81	1.785,58
Myanmar	1997	671,46	747,12		818,65	1.092,06	1.174,05	1.573,15
Cambodia	1999	668,88	726,29		763,51	873,95	922,89	1.202,62
Mean		10.087,36	10.346,13		10.149,40	11.179,34	11.311,28	12.320,19
Standard deviation		15.212,00	15.528,17		14.967,34	16.449,45	16.612,17	18.832,47
Gap highest - lowest GDP		42.116,70	44.016,12		42.452,75	49.269,83	50.802,09	57.870,87
Ratio highest/lowest GDP		63,97	61,60		56,60	57,38	56,05	49,12066156
Gini coefficient		0,68	0,68		0,67	0,66	0,66	0,65

Own calculations, source: World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$)

Appendix 1b:

Inequality in regard to social expenditures as percentage of GDP, ASEAN 1967 - 2005

Member States	Accession	1967 Bangkok Declaration	1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services	1997 ASEAN Vision 2020	1998 Hanoi Plan of Action	2000 ASEAN Plan of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters	Since 2005 Mutual Recognition Agreements
Indonesia	1967	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0,33 ^a
Malaysia	1967	N/A	2,27 ^a	2,51 ^a	2,62 ^a	2,76 ^a	2,74 ^a
The Philippines	1967	N/A	1,80 ^a	2,40 ^a	2,30 ^a	2,38	2,05
Singapore	1967	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1,50	1,10
Thailand	1967	N/A	0,52 ^a	0,81 ^a	0,86 ^a	1,52 ^b	1,34 ^b
Brunei	1984		N/A	N/A	N/A	3,29	N/A
Darussalam							
Vietnam	1995		4,28 ^b	3,89 ^b	3,27 ^b	3,21 ^b	2,77 ^a
Laos	1997			N/A	N/A	N/A	0,74
Myanmar	1997			N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cambodia	1999					1,05	1,24
Mean						2,24	1,54
Standard deviation						0,83	0,84
Gap highest - lowest social expenditures/GDP						2,24	2,44
Ratio highest/lowest social expenditures/GDP						3,13	8,39
Gini coefficient						0,21	0,30

Social expenditures, including health expenditures. Own calculations, sources: ASEAN Development Bank, ADB Key Indicators database (social protection and health), ^a national data sources; Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam: own calculations based on national reports and World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$), ^b IMF data

Appendix 1b:

Inequality in regard to social expenditures as percentage of GDP, ASEAN 2006 - 2018

Member States	Accession	2006	2007		2008	2012	2013	2018
		Introduction of a two-week visa-free entry for ASEAN nationals*	Adoption of the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers	Adoption of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint				
Indonesia	1967	0,42a	0,51a	1,46	1,04	1,11	2,67	
Malaysia	1967	2,88a	3,33a	3,10a	3,12a	3,04a	N/A	
The Philippines	1967	2,02	2,01	2,14	2,72	2,93	2,71	
Singapore	1967	2,00	1,40	3,00	3,00	2,90	3,00	
Thailand	1967	1,47b	2,00b	2,02b	2,01b	3,60	2,99	
Brunei Darussalam	1984	2,09	2,37	2,26	2,10	2,42	3,08	
Vietnam	1995	3,17a	4,22a	3,19a	3,86a	4,08a	N/A	
Laos	1997	N/A	N/A	0,46	0,72	1,20	N/A	
Myanmar	1997	N/A	N/A	N/A	1,16	1,35	2,08	
Cambodia	1999	1,23	1,35	1,40	1,98	2,04	2,30	
Mean		1,91	2,15	2,12	2,17	2,47	2,69	
Standard deviation		0,82	1,10	0,86	0,96	0,97	0,35	
Gap highest - lowest social expenditures/GDP		2,72	3,73	2,73	3,14	2,97	1,00	
Ratio highest/lowest social expenditures/GDP		7,04	8,17	6,93	5,36	3,68	1,48	
Gini coefficient		0,24	0,28	0,23	0,25	0,22	0,07	

Social expenditures, including health expenditures. Own calculations, sources: ASEAN Development Bank, ADB Key Indicators database (social protection and health), ^a national data sources; Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam: own calculations based on national reports and World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$), ^b IMF data

Appendix 2a:

Inequality in regard to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$), EU

Member States	Accession	1951 Treaty of Paris	1957 Treaty of Rome	1971 Reg. No. 1408/71	1972 Reg. No. 574/72	1985+ Schengen Agreements	1987 Single European Act	1992 Maas-tricht Treaty	1997 Treaty of Amsterdam	2004 Directive 2004/38	2009 Treaty of Lisbon
Belgium	1951	N/A	N/A	20.559,72	21.563,88	28.374,66	29.522,59	33.518,24	36.403,26	41.903,99	43.306,60
France	1951	N/A	N/A	20.880,89	21.648,55	28.315,83	29.383,96	33.041,36	34.952,52	39.794,64	40.058,68
Germany	1951	N/A	N/A	20.260,67	21.031,08	28.189,92	29.180,79	34.229,00	35.540,29	38.532,78	39.804,57
Italy	1951	N/A	N/A	17.908,89	18.464,69	26.532,24	28.157,76	31.564,42	33.861,93	37.227,15	35.503,15
Luxem-bourg	1951	N/A	N/A	36.057,45	37.973,16	47.869,48	54.131,92	71.003,67	78.075,53	99.778,47	101.939,61
Nether-lands	1951	N/A	N/A	25.275,76	25.905,69	31.242,52	32.346,37	36.627,41	41.356,45	47.575,47	50.533,51
Denmark	1973					41.720,67	43.763,91	45.803,39	51.685,99	57.608,74	57.229,04
Ireland	1973					19.188,87	19.986,48	25.292,81	34.745,18	50.546,49	48.110,55
UK	1973 - 2020					24.457,83	26.470,98	28.328,00	32.489,20	39.018,95	38.986,14
Greece	1981					18.707,57	18.257,80	19.733,29	21.198,79	27.614,41	28.514,81
Portugal	1986						13.948,98	17.639,47	19.354,83	21.858,12	22.124,58
Spain	1986						19.783,39	23.127,68	25.061,01	30.445,75	30.593,61
Austria	1995								38.084,70	43.956,58	46.123,49
Finland	1995								34.947,04	44.282,85	45.231,94
Sweden	1995								39.564,56	49.066,90	50.326,22
Cyprus	2004									29.566,83	31.216,76
Czech Republic	2004									17.014,69	19.542,46

Appendix 2a:

Inequality in regard to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$), EU

Member States	Accession	1951	1957	Reg. No. 1408/71	1972	1985+	1987	1992	1997	2004	2009
		Treaty of Paris	Treaty of Rome	Reg. No. 1408/71	Reg. No. 574/72	Schengen Agreements	Single European Act	Maas-tricht Treaty	Treaty of Amsterdam	Directive 2004/38	Treaty of Lisbon
Estonia	2004									13.411,04	14.370,51
Hungary	2004									12.592,32	13.015,78
Latvia	2004									9.760,13	11.663,01
Lithuania	2004									9.628,72	11.551,11
Malta	2004									18.718,73	20.755,88
Poland	2004									9.612,57	12.123,55
Slovakia	2004									12.407,53	15.836,61
Slovenia	2004									21.177,10	23.299,20
Bulgaria	2007										6.730,06
Romania	2007										8.496,92
Croatia	2013										
Mean				23.490,56	24.431,18	29.459,96	28.744,58	33.325,73	37.154,75	32.924,04	32.110,68
Standard deviation				6.029,11	6.437,95	8.667,27	10.707,00	13.584,84	13.364,11	19.928,91	20.162,09
Gap highest - lowest GDP				18.148,56	19.508,47	29.161,91	40.182,94	53.364,20	58.720,70	90.165,90	95.209,55
Ratio highest/lowest GDP				2,01	2,06	2,56	3,88	4,03	4,03	10,38	15,15
Gini coefficient				0,13	0,13	0,16	0,20	0,20	0,17	0,32	0,33

Own calculations, source: World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$)

Appendix 2b:

Inequality in regard to social expenditures as percentage of GDP, EU

Member States	Accession	1951 Treaty of Paris	1957 Treaty of Rome	1971 Reg. No. 1408/71	1972 Reg. No. 574/72	1985+ Schengen Agreements	1987 Single European Act	1992 Maas-tricht Treaty	1997 Treaty of Amsterdam	2004 Directive 2004/38	2009 Treaty of Lisbon
Belgium	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	25,55	25,15	24,19	24,72	25,25	28,55
France	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	25,25	19,02	25,64	28,49	28,75	31,02
Germany	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	22,23	22,72	24,11	25,38	25,94	26,64
Italy	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	20,11	20,33	21,81	22,22	23,93	27,11
Luxembourg	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	18,92	19,14	18,97	19,86	23,08	24,04
Netherlands	1951	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23,78	23,16	24,38	20,50	19,98	17,36
Denmark	1973					19,16	20,48	22,60	24,16	25,12	28,25
Ireland	1973					20,37	19,79	18,50	15,51	15,15	23,11
UK	1973 - 2020					18,18	17,39	17,82	15,81	18,38	22,24
Greece	1981					15,37	15,18	15,39	16,91	18,40	23,97
Portugal	1986						10,69	13,76	16,44	21,65	24,54
Spain	1986						16,76	21,07	20,01	20,14	25,38
Austria	1995								25,85	26,33	27,47
Finland	1995								26,62	24,01	26,87
Sweden	1995								28,87	27,67	27,63
Cyprus	2004									13,20 ^a	14,50 ^a
Czech Republic	2004									17,94	20,12

- continued on next page -

Appendix 2b:

Inequality in regard to social expenditures as percentage of GDP, EU

Member States	Accession	1951 Treaty of Paris	1957 Treaty of Rome	1971 Reg. No. 1408/71	1972 Reg. No. 574/72	1985+ Schengen Agreements	1987 Single European Act	1992 Maas-tricht Treaty	1997 Treaty of Amsterdam	2004 Directive 2004/38	2009 Treaty of Lisbon
Estonia	2004									13,31	19,31
Hungary	2004									21,07	23,28
Latvia	2004									13,07	18,09
Lithuania	2004									13,22	21,82
Malta	2004									18,70 ^a	18,90 ^a
Poland	2004									21,11	21,19
Slovakia	2004									15,92	18,20
Slovenia	2004									21,55	22,43
Bulgaria	2007										16,90 ^a
Romania	2007										17,10 ^a
Croatia	2013										
Mean						20,89	19,15	20,69	22,09	20,51	22,82
Standard deviation						3,11	3,70	3,64	4,45	4,66	4,24
Gap highest - lowest social expenditures/GDP						10,18	14,46	11,88	13,36	15,68	14,12
Ratio highest/lowest social expenditures/GDP						1,66	2,35	1,86	1,86	2,20	1,84
Gini coefficient						0,08	0,11	0,10	0,12	0,13	0,11

Social expenditures, including health expenditures. Own calculations, sources: OECD data (social spending); ^a Eurostat data (general government spending on social protection and health)

Appendix 3a:

Inequality in regard to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US\$), MERCOSUR

Member States	Accession	1991 Treaty of Asuncion	1997 Multilateral social security agreement	1998 Social-Labour Declaration	2002 Free Movement and Residence Agreement	2004 Declaration of Principles about Migratory Policy	2010 Citizenship Statute (Decision 64/10)
Argentina	1991	6.721,28	8.543,03	8.772,06	6.854,29	7.962,41	10.385,96
Brazil	1991	7.963,11	8.744,85	8.641,28	8.954,84	9.346,04	11.286,24
Paraguay	1991	3.577,52	3.943,90	3.861,79	3.406,23	3.569,44	4.355,93
Uruguay	1991	7.071,39	9.091,47	9.441,99	7.971,31	8.449,21	11.992,02
Chile ^a	1996		8.932,07	9.199,20	9.814,66	10.726,64	12.808,03
Bolivia ^a	1997		1.570,82	1.617,37	1.606,90	1.657,51	1.955,46
Peru ^a	2003					3.603,00	5.082,35
Colombia ^a	2004					5.225,25	6.336,71
Ecuador ^a	2004					4.112,67	4.633,59
Venezuela ^a	2004 ^b -2016					11.429,41	13.825,36
Guyana ^a	2015						
Suriname ^a	2015						
Mean		6.333,33	6.804,36	6.922,28	6.434,71	6.608,16	8.266,17
Standard deviation		1.654,23	2.947,28	3.039,15	2.966,25	3.222,41	4.014,97
Gap highest - lowest GDP		4.385,59	7.520,65	7.824,62	8.207,76	9.771,90	11.869,90
Ratio highest/lowest GDP		2,23	5,79	5,84	6,11	6,90	7,07
Gini coefficient		0,13	0,22	0,22	0,25	0,28	0,27

^a Associated member states; ^b full member state since 2006

Own calculations, source: World Bank data (GDP per capita in constant 2010 US\$)

Appendix 3b:

Inequality in regard to social expenditures as percentage of GDP, MERCOSUR

Member States	Accession	1991 Treaty of Asuncion	1997 Multilateral social security agreement	1998 Social-Labour Declaration	2002 Free Movement and Residence Agreement	2004 Declaration of Principles about Migratory Policy	2010 Citizenship Statute (Decision 64/10)
Argentina	1991	6,98	6,61	6,50	6,14	6,03	8,49
Brazil	1991	N/A	8,11	8,88	9,63	10,12	10,70
Paraguay	1991	N/A	N/A	N/A	1,82	1,68	2,08
Uruguay	1991	4,62	8,79	8,89	6,58	4,12	6,28
Chile ^a	1996		6,92	7,23	7,56	6,47	6,73
Bolivia ^a	1997		3,83	4,41	5,09	4,78	4,66
Peru ^a	2003					4,60 ^c	3,14 ^c
Colombia ^a	2004					4,61	6,22
Ecuador ^a	2004					0,24	1,64
Venezuela ^a	2004 ^b -2016					4,29	5,02
Guyana ^a	2015						
Suriname ^a	2015						
Mean			8,41	8,72	7,77	6,18	7,32
Standard deviation			2,05	2,04	2,79	2,84	2,84
Gap highest - lowest social expenditures/GDP			5,61	5,24	8,53	10,58	9,33
Ratio highest/lowest social expenditures/GDP			2,17	1,98	4,04	9,60	3,94
Gini coefficient			0,13	0,12	0,20	0,24	0,22

^a Associated member states; ^b full member state since 2006Social expenditures, including health expenditures. Own calculations, source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT (general government spending on social protection and health; ^c central government spending on social protection and health)

Appendix 4:
Development of the Immigrant Stock in ASEAN, 1990 - 2015

Year	Immigrant Stock	
	Intra-regional	External
1990	1.340.569	1.536.047
1995	2.159.835	1.540.222
2000	3.174.800	1.752.033
2005	4.388.499	2.133.844
2010	5.982.932	2.690.761
2015	6.627.200	2.982.723

Own calculations, source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migrant Stock 2019. As data on immigrant stock is not available on a yearly basis, the data does not show the milestone years, but five year intervals starting in 1990.

Appendix 5:
Development of the Immigrant Stock in the EU, 1990 – 2015

Year	Immigrant Stock	
	Intra-regional	External
1990	6.682.007	15.145.263
1995	7.738.343	19.375.959
2000	8.241.731	23.124.474
2005	11.980.110	29.442.041
2010	17.412.566	31.649.904
2015	18.866.309	34.044.758

Own calculations, source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migrant Stock 2019

Appendix 6:
Development of the Immigrant Stock in Mercosur, 1990 - 2015

Year	Immigrant Stock	
	Intra-regional	External
1990	717.306	3.050.139
1995	734.984	2.901.636
2000	752.307	2.751.728
2005	901.754	2.736.950
2010	1.038.864	2.943.610
2015	1.171.830	3.270.749

Own calculations, source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migrant Stock 2019